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Review article
Considering a complemental model of health and fitness
Ross D. Neville
College of Arts and Tourism, Dublin Institute of Technology, Ireland
Abstract This article examines the concept of fitness, which, in spite of its much avowed
cultural significance, has become the subject of much critical attention. In
particular, it considers the now contested relation of fitness to health; the fact
that, although there appears to be a clear consensus on a simple causal relation
between the two, this has been deemed illusory outside the medico-scientific
context of its production. In response to the problems with both of these
positions, this article examines the potential for reconfiguring the relation
between fitness and health on new terms. A complemental model of health and
fitness is proposed; one that strives to account for the body’s objective and
subjective dimensions and for those intermediary varieties of experience that lie in
between.
Keywords: health and fitness, complemental model, complemental curve, intermediary
varieties of experience
Introduction
In spite of its avowed cultural significance and much as it continues to be legitimated by the
fields of health and medicine, the concept of fitness has been the subject of much critical
attention of late. On the one hand, it is clear that our imagination as academics,
policymakers, and legislators has been captured by the promise of fitness. That is to say, on
the basis of the seemingly incontrovertible evidence that physical activity and exercise
contribute in a simple causal manner in improving health, it is now commonly thought that
fitness is the most desirable state of the individual’s body in modern society – something akin
to the new health – and promises nothing less than new and improved standards of wellbeing
in the public domain. On the other hand, however, this emphasis on fitness (particularly
individual fitness) has been deemed to be problematic. Critical accounts have tended to
emphasise the politically driven dimensions of these ostensibly natural facts, the alignment of
the public–private divide in the service of economic interests which the fitness industries now
clearly engender, and the subsequent privatisation of socially borne risk. If, as Freund and
Martin (2004) suggested, fitness is best understood in relational terms, then what fitness is
related to on these critical accounts is mere consumption activity and is, therefore, quite
separate from the aforementioned progressive convictions to improving health and
enhancing wellbeing.
One broad concern that is worth highlighting at the outset is the fact that these opposing
accounts of fitness have typically come from functionally separated spheres of the academy.
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And on this basis, there appears to have been little in the way of exchange (not to mention
confluence) of opinion. Debates about the relative merits of fitness and its relation to health
fall into two categories. On the one hand there is no debate about the relation between fitness
and health because the supporting medico-scientific evidence makes this relation so self-
evident. On the other, debates are couched in a language so abstract that the possibility of
external critique is excluded. In spite of the presence of this impasse constraining disciplinary
discourse, however, the main concern in this article is to engage both these perspectives in a
work of retrieval and, in particular, to examine the now contested relation of fitness to
health. The purpose of this article is to argue that both these perspectives are insufficient, and
that what is needed is neither uncritical praise nor root-and-branch condemnation.
Borrowing a phrase from Latour (2004a), there is a need for refocusing attention towards
matters of concern.
The first two sections of this article take issue with both the attribution of a simple causal
relation between fitness and health and its opposition, the notion that this is merely illusory.
On the basis of the shortcomings of both these accounts, and in order to work towards an
alternative position with respect to the relation of fitness and health, the final two sections of
this article explore the possibilities for, and implications of, reconfiguring this relation on
complemental terms. A complemental model of health and fitness is offered, both as a means
of reconciling this critical impasse and as an avenue for future research concerning the
variegated structuring of bodily experience.
The promise of fitness
In a specific sense, the significance attributed to fitness is undeniable and the economic
strength of the fitness industry is typically cited as a measure of its cultural value. For
example, it has experienced steady growth over the past four decades in line with a large-scale
decline of membership in more traditional social and community-based organisations. Over
recent years, in particular, the fitness industry has come to the fore as the leading segment of
the leisure facilities sector (Datamonitor 2010). According to the International Health,
Racquet and Sportsclub Association (IHRSA), over 128,000 clubs served approximately 119
million members in the year 2009, many of whom, despite the current economic climate, were
new members (IHRSA 2010). It is difficult to think of another sector of the leisure industries
which, given such unfavourable economic conditions, shows such a strong growth trend.1
In spite of this, it would be a perverse misunderstanding of the magnitude of fitness to
consider it in mere quantitative terms. As one of the most commonly visited sites for
recreational consumption, for example, the fitness club industry has emerged as a
powerhouse in international commercial leisure. Its cultural significance is evidenced by the
fact that it is both shaped by and has shaped the major trends of contemporary leisure (for
example, privatisation, individualisation, commercialisation, rationalisation, hybridisation,
simulation) and the fact that the practice of ‘going to the gym’ and ‘working out’ has now
sparked off something of a cultural phenomenon by offering opportunities for physical
activity from a variety of traditional institutionalised disciplines. Perhaps the most striking
development, in terms of its cultural significance, however, is the fact that growth in the
fitness industries has been strong worldwide (as opposed to being confined to the
traditionally high-performing North American and European markets). And while one might
seek to argue vehemently against the imposition of western values and bodily ideals upon
other non-western cultures, it is a testament to the increasingly global appeal of the fitness
movement (Datamonitor 2010, IHRSA 2010).
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The consensus position on health and fitness
More specific to the task of this article is the notion that the long-term success of the fitness
industries is attributable (at least in part) to the simple fact that there now exists a well-
sedimented position with respect to fitness and its relation to health. That is to say, support
for the fitness industry is, in large part, linked to an overwhelmingly successful
epistemological project (see Glassner 1990, Pronger 2002). Taking this into consideration, it
might be useful to refer to this epistemological project as having spawned a consensus
position. The consensus position rests upon two primary axes: (i) that fitness is
multidimensional and (ii) that fitness is oriented, hierarchically, towards health as its higher
order construct.
Fitness is multidimensional in the narrow sense insofar as it refers to a set or composite of
attributes that people have or lack in varying degrees. For Casperson et al. (1985) for
example, these attributes are divided into health-related and skill-related components and
include such things as cardio-respiratory and muscular endurance, muscular strength, body
composition and flexibility. It is multidimensional in the broader sense in that it implies that
an individual has attained a set of characteristics and that they permit the good performance
of a specified task in a given material and psycho-social environment (Bouchard and
Shephard 1994). The characteristics underscored by Bouchard and Shephard are both health-
related and skill-related. However, they include a broader range of morphological, motor,
muscular, metabolic and cardiorespiratory components. For Casperson et al. and Bouchard
and Shephard fitness is characterised as an individual phenomenon; a measure of individual
bodily indices relative to acceptable and statistically verifiable parameters.
The second aspect of the consensus position is that fitness and health are conceived on
hierarchical terms. In this hierarchy physical activity and exercise, fitness, and health are
treated as discrete phenomena that are related to one another along a shared plane of
causality, and following the logic that physical activity and exercise contribute to fitness,
which contributes to positive health outcomes. It is notable here that, for both Casperson et
al. and Bouchard and Shephard, it is the health-related components of fitness that are
deemed to be the most important in this hierarchical configuration. That is to say, within the
hierarchical model of health and fitness (a perhaps more appropriate name for the consensus
position), it is health that functions as the most important goal or, more accurately, as the
higher order construct. And that is to say that health is a logically independent phenomenon
to which the predicate fitness is applied in a relative manner.
The problematic of fitness
Positions contrary to this consensus are more difficult to pin down (and, perhaps, are much
less amenable to consensus). For one, that fitness is a cultural phenomenon is something that
most would be willing to acknowledge. And secondly, the fact that the consensus position
with respect to health and fitness is so conceptually embedded within a system of formal and
informal inferences with respect to health means that the possibility of a critique is almost
entirely negated.
In the interests of brevity, it might be said that the critics of this consensus position take
both of these as its target. Since the emphasis in this article is on the relation of fitness to
health, and since arguments about the cultural significance of the body and its fitness have
been well rehearsed in existing sociological literature with respect to health (see for example,
Foucault 1980, Lupton 1995, Nettleton 1995, Petersen 1997, Petersen and Lupton 1996), I
confine myself to the following two remarks on the latter. For critics of fitness, at least, its
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cultural significance is blinded to a deeper political agenda insofar as its practices, discourses
and institutions are set up in such a way that they align public health concerns with private
projects of self-creation (Glassner 1989, 1990, Pronger 2002, Smith Maguire 2008, White
et al. 1995). That is to say, the fitness field is set up in such a way that the burden of socially
borne health risks are now directed towards the individual, and that these individuals are
directed towards the market for their relief. Secondly, and on this basis, although there has
been a tendency to see fitness as the new health – to see it as akin to what Petersen (1997:
197) referred to as the ‘new social movement’ with a primary concern to ‘empower citizens’ –
it has also been suggested that those progressivist convictions to social regeneration and
collective self-improvement upon which the fitness field was built have now largely faded into
insignificance. The fitness movement is criticised on the basis of the growing link between
physical and consumption activity, the decline in emphasis on the use-value of the body in
favour of its exchange- and sign-value, and for the general re-appropriation of its principal
referent (that is, health) to meet capitalist objectives. The fitness movement is criticised for
losing touch of its modernist illusions, or rather, for never adequately serving them in the first
place.
Since the nature of the relation between fitness and health has received much less attention
outside a medico-scientific context I would like to focus more specifically on the works of
three authors who have discussed this in a sociological context. The following section focuses
on the work of Smith Maguire (2006, 2008), Glassner (1989, 1990) and Bauman (1998, 2000).
Health, fitness, and the problem of normativity
The work of Smith Maguire (2006, 2008) has sought to grasp the problematic relation
between fitness and health. In an earlier publication, for example, Smith Maguire explained
that lived definitions of fitness are much less straightforward than the consensus position
would lead one to believe, since they involve qualitative feelings of capacity, notions of
control (over our bodies and how others see us), and socially constructed norms and
expectations. For Smith Maguire, fitness is a complex concept with an awkward relation to
health because, even though physical activity and exercise often make us fit according to the
medico-scientific consensus, to look or feel fit is not always necessarily to be healthy. In later
publications, this complexity is underscored again. However, the specific relation of fitness to
health appears to have been supplanted by the more general question of whether or not
fitness is good for us. In the final chapter of the book, Fit for Consumption: Sociology and the
Business of Fitness, Smith Maguire (2008) asks the question, ‘Is fitness good for us?’
acknowledging that there is no ‘yes or no’ answer to this question. Rather, for most of those
lower down the socioeconomic ladder – those who are more likely to be classed overweight
or obese – the answer is a definitive no. This is because of a lack of consumption preferences
that make the participation of this group unlikely and because of the ongoing withdrawal of
subsidised public service facilities. Smith Maguire concludes that the commercial fitness field
largely functions in a manner that reproduces the deeply entrenched, class-based stratification
of health and health risks. And, in response to the aforementioned question then, it is only
for a much smaller and more enfranchised segment of the population that the answer is yes
(though even this turns out to be problematic on Smith Maguire’s account).
Despite the broad and encompassing character of her initial questions, then, Smith
Maguire’s analysis actually turns out to be an analysis of whether or not the commercial
fitness industries (or ‘the fitness field’) are good for us. The logic of the fitness industry (not
necessarily the logic of fitness in a more general sense) has taken on the logic of consumption.
That is to say, the fitness field now promotes a relation to the body that, in large part,
encourages and permits the consumption of pleasures in other spheres such that, as Smith
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Maguire explains, we have become bodies fit to consume and fit to be consumed by others.
To be sure, this might provide evidence that the vested interest of the fitness industries exist in
an awkward relation to health. But this is quite different from saying that the logic of fitness
more generally is now distinct from that of health. In fact, had Smith Maguire been more
encompassing in defining what constitutes the fitness field, it is quite likely that her analysis
and conclusions would have turned out to be quite different. Despite the fact that the insights
into, and conclusions drawn about, the underlying assumptions of the consumer leisure
market’s framing of physical activity are both compelling and disconcerting, the initial
question of fitness’ problematic relation with health (and, indeed, the question of whether or
not ‘fitness is good for us’) goes largely unanswered.
For others, the question of fitness’ problematic relation to health is related to the use of the
conjoined phrase ‘health and fitness’. In particular, for Glassner and for Bauman, the use of
the terms in this manner is a mistake. For Glassner (1990), although some fitness enthusiasts
would be inclined (indeed, able) to distinguish between fitness and health, the two have
become generally synonymous in their everyday and popular usage. Each term, Glassner
explains, necessarily solicits the other, with the longer expression, ‘health and fitness’,
invoked primarily when fitness enthusiasts want to draw specific attention to non-exercise
components (that is, general activity levels or aspects of nutrition and diet). On this account
then, one might say that, in the everyday usage of health and fitness there seems to be a sense
of holism at play. Putting it in Rortyan (Rorty 1979) terms, it might be said that words like
fitness take on their everyday meaning only insofar as they are related to other words like
health (or diet, exercise, and physical activity) and not on the basis of any singularly
representative character. Such a position, of course, implies, as Glassner explained, that
people accept the well-confirmed medico-scientific evidence of the ameliorative and adaptive
superiority of a strong, fat-free body. It implies the general uptake of something like the
consensus position outlined in the previous section, which, today, seems entirely likely.
Contrary to such a holistic interpretation, Bauman (1998, 2000) is less eager to account for
or rationalise the use of fitness and health in such a manner. Rather, with his analysis taking
place within the context of liquid modernity, Bauman’s effort highlights some profound
differences between fitness and health and calls into question their commensurability and
suitability of fit. Like Glassner, Bauman thinks that treating fitness and health synonymously
is a mistake (perhaps even a category mistake, as we will see). And this is not merely for the
‘well-known fact that not all fitness regimes ‘‘are good for one’s health’’ and that what helps
one to stay healthy does not necessarily make one fit’ (Bauman 2000: 77). Rather, for
Bauman, health and fitness belong to two different discourses because they appeal to very
different concerns about, and relations to, the body (the body and society).
For Bauman, since contemporary society needs neither the physical nor productive
exertion required in earlier modes of sociality, it is the desire for consumption and not
necessarily the demands of work that play the formative role in shaping individuals’ relations
to their bodies. On the basis of this shifting emphasis from being a society of producers to
being a society of consumers, and since our present stage in the history of modernity has
implicated individuals in a shift in concern from the ultimate ends in human life to pragmatic
concerns about the optimal performance of means, fitness is depicted as having replaced
health as the desired status of the human body. That is, as Bauman (1998, 2000) explained,
since constant openness and an appeal to ever-greater levels of experience are the sine qua non
of being integrated into this changing society, it is not the healthy body with its connotation
of a steady state but the mobile, flexible, spontaneous and sensation-imbibing fit body that
grasps the quality expected of modern individuals (or ‘the experience-collector’, Bauman
1998: 23). For Bauman (2000), fitness is revelatory of social life under modernity in its
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present, liquid stage because the fit body is multifunctional – driven by the principle of
mobility and the logic of flows – and because it is anything but solid.
In spite of this emphasis, it is problematic for Bauman that fitness has replaced health as
the desired normative status for individuals in modern society.2 This is due to the fact that
fitness presents self-referential problems from which the norm of health was free (Bauman
1998: 23).3 Bauman explains this further:
[Health] is a norm, and norms are clearly delineated from above and below alike. ‘Fitness’
has perhaps its lower, though rather blurred and murky threshold, but cannot, by
definition, have an upper limit; ‘fitness’ is, after all, about the constant ability to move
further on, to rise to ever higher levels of experience. Hence ‘fitness’ will never acquire the
comforting exactitude of a norm. ‘Fitness’ is a never-to-be-reached horizon looming
forever in the future. (Bauman 1998: 23)
Fitness, then, is not merely reflexively mobilised (as would be the case with most categories
under liquid modernity). Rather, it is reflexive by its very nature (by definition). Elsewhere,
Bauman describes this inherent reflexivity in more detail:
If health is a ‘no more and no less’ type of condition, fitness stays permanently open on the
side of ‘more’: it does not refer to a particular standard of bodily capacity, but to its
(preferably unlimited) potential of expansion… One may almost say that if health is about
‘sticking to the norm’, fitness is about the capacity to break all norms and leave every
already achieved standard behind. (Bauman 2000: 77–8)
On this basis, Bauman concludes that, unlike the care for one’s health, the pursuit of fitness
has no natural or logical end. Since its targets can only be set in the context of a never-ending
effort, the experience of fitness is often characterised by a perpetual sense of disappointment
and anti-climax or, at best, the celebration of only momentary successes achieved thus far.
The only thing fitness seekers know for sure, Bauman explains, is that they are not fit enough
yet (‘success thus far is but a short break before another round of hard work’) (Bauman
2000: 78). Theirs is a logic of diffe´rance – of difference and perpetual deferral of gratification
– because accounts of fitness have a naturally ambivalent character. The plight of the fitness-
seeker, Bauman concludes, is one of perpetual self-scrutiny and self-reproach; an agony of
which our health-seeking ancestors had no inkling.
Given the originality of Bauman’s account of the relation between fitness and health, there
is much value to be found in his characterisation of fitness as an ontologically mutable
category. The broader implication of this is that fitness is, somewhat ironically, unfit for
purpose (that is, that it cannot fulfil the normative role that is aspires to). Bauman is almost
certainly correct in his assertion that, although a prime motive in the turning of our attention
towards bodily fitness was meant to offer security and certainty in a radically disembedding
socio-material environment, our preoccupation with matters of superficial embodiment has
resulted (somewhat paradoxically) in the generation of more anxiety than less. On this basis,
there is much merit in his more general argument for the dislocation of health and fitness.
However, a caveat is necessary. That is, while it is fitness that is roundly criticised on
Bauman’s account, from my perspective it appears to be health that turns out to be the
problematic category. In Bauman’s account, health is something of a zombie category (to use
Beck’s phrase), embodying an outmoded horizon of experience that is logically incompatible
with the radically disembedding character of an increasingly instrumental and consumption-
oriented rationality. Fitness, though elusive by its very definition, is at the very least
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pragmatic in that it provides a means of becoming other and of reorienting the body and the
self in the face of the consequences of modernity. On the basis of this distinction, a positive
appropriation of Bauman’s account is offered in the following sections.
Considering a complemental model of health and fitness
The relation of fitness to health is a complex one and there are problems to be encountered
in both elevating health and dispensing with it to accommodate the concept of fitness. On
the one hand, elevating health seems to imply making it an absolute concept; a
characteristic that surely makes it an unserviceable goal. As Engelhardt (1975) aptly noted,
how many people do you know that have ever achieved complete physical, mental and
social wellbeing? One way of looking at this problem is to say that the main problem the
supporters of the consensus position encounter is akin to the problem that has led Rorty
(1998) towards a deflationary (or pragmatic) account of Truth (with a capital ‘T’). Rorty
explained that justification (lower case) is relative to an audience and a range of truth
candidates, but Truth is not relative to anything. It is only the relative, Rorty explains,
about which there is anything to say. Correspondingly, one might just as easily say that, on
the consensus position outlined earlier, it is fitness that is relative to a range of biomedical
indicators, but health is not relative to anything. Not only does the consensus position
make health an unserviceable goal, then, it makes the notion that fitness contributes to
health a mere tautology.
One might grant that fitness is, indeed, multidimensional (though it need not be confined
to certain avowed dimensions as Freund and Martin 2004 have shown). However, that it is
related to health on hierarchical terms is much less clear. Or one might take a more hard-
nosed critical position and say that the multidimensional characterisation of fitness does
nothing to violate its relational character, but the hierarchical structuring is (borrowing from
Baudrillard) merely the vehicle of an egalitarian myth. One might grant the fact that
preserving the health–fitness distinction is helpful in safeguarding health from being
trivialised. But it might also be granted that such a distinction is merely blinding us to the
logic of flows that characterise liquid modernity.
Although Bauman’s position might appear more obviously plausible – and it is one, as will
be seen, that does offer a workable alternative – his account, as it stands, is also subject to a
number of difficulties. For one, Bauman (2000: 77) goes on to acknowledge that the status of
all norms, ‘the norm of health included’, has been severely shaken and become fragile. And in
this sense, bracketing concerns about the status of health in order to criticise fitness appears
disingenuous at best, and the intellectual equivalent of having one’s cake and eating it too at
worst. A more fundamental problem, however, is the fact that the thoroughgoing futurity of
his position is insensitive to what Throop (2010) has referred to as the ‘vicissitudes of
experience’. In exploring its multilayered character, for example, Throop (2010: 267) has
argued that experience is best situated along a continuum of possible formulations, from the
disjunctive immersion in the immediacy of practical activity to the mediacy of the conjunctive
or distanced reflection events that have previously lapsed. These different temporal
orientations, Throop (2010) explains, should be seen to affect a ‘variegated structuring of
experience’ and, hence, to affect an alteration in a subject’s mode of attention. On this basis,
Throop concludes that:
while it is true that we often maintain an attitude toward the world that is structured
according to a future orientation toward goals, projects, and desires… it is also the case
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that there are moments where it is not merely attention to the future, but attention to the
past or the contingencies of the present that directs our attention… [I]t is often the case
that individuals have little other choice than to deal with their immediate immersion in the
present moment. (Throop 2010: 267–8)
For Throop then, Bauman’s wholesale futurity would seem to privilege becoming over being,
flux over stasis, activity over passivity, granularity over coherence and discordance over
concordance at the expense of the relations between them. And it is this very privileging,
Throop (2010: 212) explains, that negates the possibilities for understanding what he has
referred to as dysphoric moments – broadly analogous to Heidegger’s (1962: 103) concept of
the ‘un-ready-to-hand’, Merleau-Ponty’s (2002: 157) severing of the ‘intentional arc’, or
Leder’s (1990: 83) concept of ‘bodily dys-appearance’ – those ‘world-destroying’ moments in
which the very sense of futurity is necessarily effaced.
In a general sense, this might be expanded to say that Bauman’s position with respect to
health and fitness negates the possibilities for understanding those situations in which
individuals experience a modified temporality, and where it is the past or the present that is
foregrounded in one’s organisation of attention. In a more specific sense, it might be said that
Bauman’s position negates the possibilities for understanding those situations in which
individuals’ orientation towards their bodies change. It is certainly true that modern
individuals’ experiences of their embodied selves are structured according to being fit for the
future and its possibilities. But surely, given the vulnerability and precariousness of human
embodiment, individuals are not oriented towards the future in a wholesale manner. Rather,
just as the body is something to be lived through in a subjective sense, it is also at times
something to be maintained or rationalised, even something to be overcome or salvaged. Is it
not the case that, with instances such as these, it is attention to the present objective status of
the body at stasis that directs individuals’ focus of attention? And is this not also tantamount
to saying that, in certain instances, it is the health of the body (body-object) and not
necessarily its fitness (as a body-subject) that becomes prominent?
Health, fitness, and the complemental curve
A possible way of reconciling the problems with the opposing positions discussed in this
article is to make a number of modifications to Bauman’s position, which I think is more
plausible (especially because it appears to account for health on descriptive as opposed to
absolute terms). Three points will suffice in outlining the contours and implications of this
intermediary position. Firstly, one has to be clear on what Bauman means (or what he could
mean by extension) by health and by fitness. Recall that, for Bauman, health and fitness
appeal to discourses and relations to the body quite apart from one another. That is to say,
whereas health can be delineated from above and below and is, thus, both an object of logic
and epistemology; fitness (though perhaps having a lower threshold) is resistant to such
conceptual determination and is, therefore, ontologically ambivalent. On this basis, one can
take Bauman’s distinction as having meant that health and fitness correspond to two specific
planes of experience (on the basis of their appeal to different discourses) which can be
represented graphically. Figure 1 shows a possible interpretation of Bauman’s position.
On the basis of this illustration, it can be said that, where Health (upper case) corresponds
to a bounded vertical (or epistemological) plane of experience upon which norms can be
imposed, fitness (lower case) represents its boundless horizontal (or ontological) corollary
which, by its very definition (and by itself), is resistant to any code of normativity. Contrary
to Bauman’s original formulation, this illustration retains the importance of Health.
Following Leder (1992), Health is taken to correspond to the mechanistic body-object that
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medical thought and practice presuppose whereas fitness, on the other hand, is designated by
the phenomenological or lived body-subject.
Secondly, it is important to outline the conditions for an alternative conception on how
Health and fitness might be thought to interact. Rather than treating Health and fitness in a
causal relationship (as supporters of the consensus position do) or dislocating them (as
Bauman appears to want to do) it will be more instructive to say that Health and fitness exist
in a complemental relation. Leder’s (1990) use of Freud’s complemental series is helpful here.
The complemental series exhibits two important characteristics. Firstly, it provides a heuristic
whereupon a gradated series of phenomena, experiences, or cases can be plotted between
what have seemed to be intractable positions. Secondly, with the complemental series, it is to
be observed of the phenomena involved that an increase in one factor necessarily correlates
with a decrease in the other. As Freud (2000) originally explained, there is no reason to deny
the existence of seemingly opposing cases at the two ends of the series. However, in order to
cover most of the cases in between, it will be observed that the diminishing intensity of one
factor is balanced by the increasing intensity of the other. As regards their relation then,
rather than exhibiting a causal structure – which precludes an understanding of that
peculiarly phenomenological tension that exists between the experience of one’s body as both
an object and subject – the complemental model depicts a figure-ground structure whereupon
Health and fitness interact at various levels. This figure-ground structure, again, can be
represented graphically as is shown in the Figure 2.
By joining H30 to f1, H29 to f2, H28 to f3, H27 to f4, and so on in an inverse manner, the
model depicts a complemental curve whereupon varying degrees of prominence can be
attributed to both Health and to fitness at the same time. That is to say, the complemental
curve provides a means of accounting for both the body’s objective and subjective
dimensions and for the mapping of a whole host of what Throop (2009: 536) has referred to
as ‘intermediary varieties of experience’ in between.4
Thirdly, by plotting points of intersection along the curve – dots plotted on the curve at
(H21, f1), (H11, f5), (H5, f12) and (H1, f22) which might usefully be referred to as fixational
Health 
fitness
Figure 1: The planes of the Health and fitness experience
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junctures – the model suggests two important final things. Firstly, with the complemental
model, an increase in fitness along the horizontal axis does not imply an increase in Health
on the vertical one, as would traditionally be the case. Rather, engaging the lived body-
subject through fitness should be seen as rendering at varying levels of backgrounded
awareness Health and the body-object it presupposes.5 And secondly, in the complemental
model, Health should be seen to function as a ‘narrative mode of comprehension’ (Ricoeur
1984: 159). That is, it enables us to cope with the logic of flows that characterise fitness in a
manner that promotes what Ricoeur (1984: 66) referred to as a ‘concordant discordance’.
That is to say, its vertical character cuts through the temporally ambivalent character of
fitness in such a way that the succession of episodic sequences can be thought of, not merely
as ‘one thing after another’, but, rather, as ‘one thing because of another’ (1984: 52). This
emphasis on concordance over discordance is of particular value in ameliorating those
hermeneutical problems outlined in the previous section, problems associated with the oft-
experienced indeterminacy, frailty, and precariousness of human embodiment. One might go
as far as to say that the success of the biomedical model is a product of what Ricoeur (1984:
31) has referred to as the mythopoeic triumph of concordance over discordance. Moreover, it
is perhaps only through an immersion in activities that Leder (1990: 166) has described as
having ecstatic qualities (or promoting the ‘one-body’) that the vertical character of Health
and the body-object it presupposes can become entirely effaced. Only then can a space be
opened up for the free play of the centrifugal, ecstatic fit body-subject without reservation or
arrest.
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 f10 f11 f12 f13 f14 f15 f16 f17 f18 f19 f20 f21 f22 f23 f24 f25 f26 f27 f28 f29 f30
H30
H29
H28
H27
H26
H25
H24
H23
H22
H21
H20
H19
H18
H17
H16
H15
H14
H13
H12
H11
H10
H9
H8
H7
H6
H5
H4
H3
H2
H1
Health 
fitness
Figure 2: The complemental curve
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Conclusion
This article has been based on the premise that the concept fitness and, in particular, its
relation to health has been the subject of much recent critical attention. Given this, it was
observed that there has been a general tendency for scholarship in this area to make either
one of two claims: (i) that fitness and health are causally related (that is, that there is a simple
linear relationship between physical activity and exercise for fitness and positive health
outcomes) or (ii) that this is merely illusory (that is, that aligning fitness and health is a deeply
political project, it does little more than service the economic interests of the broader fitness
industries, and, as such, fitness is something quite apart from health). Importantly, it was also
observed that there has been little in the way of exchange between these two opposing
positions which, despite the shared context of their subject matter, have come from
functionally separate parts of the academy. On this basis, and on the basis of a number of
observed inadequacies with both of these positions, the purpose of this article was to engage
with these perspectives and explore the possibilities for proposing an alternative. While it is
unclear as to whether an article like this could offer a means of reconciling the resulting
impasse between scholarly disciplines, I hope that by engaging with these opposing
viewpoints it has been effective in doing at least two things.
Firstly, the article lamented that debates about fitness have often descended into polemic.
It endeavoured to take seriously the claim that there is a relation between fitness and health
while also acknowledging the fact that there is something wrong with the nature of the
relation as it is presently conceived. That is to say, the arguments put forward in this article
have endeavoured to take seriously the claim (contrary to Smith Maguire’s) that fitness is
good for us, while also acknowledging that this good need not necessarily be health. It was
shown that, while the notion that what is good in terms of fitness is quite apart from what is
good in terms of Health (or rather, that fitness and Health correspond to separate planes of
experience, as I have said) was already present in Bauman’s analysis, that they can be equally
valid (especially in the context of our present stage in the history of liquid modernity) was
much less apparent in this work.6 On this basis, it was argued that a lack of a common good
between fitness and health should in no way be seen to negate the possibility for exploring the
relation between them (as Bauman would appear to suggest). Rather, it just meant that it had
to be conceived of on new terms.
Secondly, and in response to this relational assignment, this article has contributed to the
growing literature on the sociology of health and fitness by examining the possibilities for a
redescription of the relation between fitness and Health. In effect, it has offered another
plausible description of what Freund and Martin (2004) have referred to as the relational
model of fitness. Rather than treating fitness and Health on hierarchical terms, and without
advocating a view that would resign the latter to the conceptual wastebasket, the
complemental model described in this article acknowledged the importance of the embodied
subject while also acknowledging the fact that there exists a whole host of intermediary
varieties of experience in which we can (or, indeed, are forced to) reflect upon and become
mindful of our bodies as objects. That is to say, in reconfiguring the relation of fitness to
Health, the complemental model has taken into account the fact that the body is a functional
gestalt, both subject and object, a site of representation and practice, over-exposed and
under-exposed, attuned to multiple temporal orientations, and characterised by a series of
absent–present relations. In a general sense then, in its examination of the relation of fitness
and Health, this article has taken very seriously what Eagleton (1993) meant when he said
that, while it is not quite true that I have a body, it is not quite true that I am one either. On
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this basis, future empirical research would do well to consider more specifically the variegated
structuring of bodily experience that traverses the complemental curve. This requires an
examination of the extent and conditions under which an individual’s orientation towards
their body changes. In fact, it implies that a further examination of the extent and conditions
under which the body is amenable to change more generally is needed.
Of particular importance in the context of this article’s two main contributions is the need
for further consideration with respect to how to talk about the fit body, which, in the context
of an increasingly emphasised dual structure of the phenomenological body, has not been
adequately explored. It is clear that we have not yet come to terms with the task of talking
about the fit body and the extent of its somatic potential to affect and be affected. Freund
and Martin’s (2004) social ecology of fitness (of en-abling bodies) is a noteworthy
contribution. It is noteworthy insofar as it begun in shifting the emphasis away from
individual fitness and the substantive ‘I am’ to a notion of fitness and the fit body that is
grounded in terms of contextualised abilities (an ‘I can’) and the relations of fit between
individuals and their socio-material environments. However, in order to build on this shifting
emphasis, there is a need for future research to focus on a broader range of objects, artefacts,
techniques, technologies and subjects that (following Latour 2004b) might be thought of as
contributing to the progressive articulation of the fit body-subject, thus en-abling it and
making it possible for individuals to inhabit the world in new ways.
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Notes
1 For example, in 2008 Hans Muench (IHRSA Director Europe) noted that, for over the last 20 years,
the fitness industry has grown consistently and has proved itself to be recession resilient (quoted in
Amend 2008). Even more recent figures, despite declining economic conditions, have not shown this
to be untrue (IHRSA 2010).
2 Bauman’s articulation of the problem of fitness can be divided into three main themes: the problem of
normativity, perspective, and interpersonal comparison. For the purposes of this article, and in the
interests of the space constraints that apply, the focus of attention is on the first.
3 Bauman’s account of health is typically Boorsian in that it aligns with Boorse’s (1977) classification of
health as normal functional ability.
4 One thinks of Fox’s (2002) characterisation of the growing body, the becoming-fit body, the
cancerous body, the valetudinarian body and the dying body as useful examples of this series of
intermediary varieties of experiencing one’s body along the complemental curve.
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5 This resonates particularly well with Boorse’s (1977) distinction between intrinsic and instrumental
or positive health (between normal functional ability and what is beyond it). In this distinction,
Boorse, too, considers whether there is a causal relation between fitness and health or, rather, if
physical fitness merely effects a resistance to disease. Boorse appears to tend towards the latter view.
Someone with a high level of physical fitness (however differently he might have defined the terms)
might certainly be thought of as being healthier than someone without such a high level. However,
this is due to the former’s increased ability to resist disease and not due to any increase in intrinsic
health.
6 For an account of how fitness practices can acquire specific meanings for participants over time, see
Crossley (2004, 2006, 2008) and Sassatelli (1999a, 1999b).
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